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Driver Licensing vs. the
Right to Travel
The following argument has been used in at least three states (Pennsylvania,
Ohio, and West Virginia) as a legal brief to support a demand for dismissal
of charges of "driving without a license." It is the argument that
was the reason for the charges to be dropped, or for a "win" in
court against the argument that free people can have their right to travel
regulated by their servants.
The forgotten legal maxim is that free people have a right to travel
on the roads which are provided by their servants for that purpose, using
ordinary transportation of the day. Licensing cannot be required of free
people, because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender
of a right. The driver's license can be required of people who use the
highways for trade, commerce, or hire; that is, if they earn their living
on the road, and if they use extraordinary machines on the roads. If you
are not using the highways for profit, you cannot be required to have a
driver's license.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE FOR
DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
NOW, comes the Accused, appearing specially and not generally or voluntarily,
but under threat of arrest if he failed to do so, with this "BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION," stating
as follows:
ARGUMENT
If ever a judge understood the public's right to use the public roads,
it was Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.
Justice Tolman stated:
"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing
that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and
yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may
be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit,
then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from
them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment." Robertson
vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133, 147.
The words of Justice Tolman ring most prophetically in the ears of Citizens
throughout the country today as the use of the public roads has been monopolized
by the very entity which has been empowered to stand guard over our freedoms,
i.e., that of state government.
RIGHTS
The "most sacred of liberties" of which Justice Tolman spoke
was personal liberty. The definition of personal liberty is:
"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is
one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its
inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived
from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted
to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of
the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private
property ... and is regarded as inalienable." 16 C.J.S., Constitutional
Law, Sect.202, p.987
This concept is further amplified by the definition of personal liberty:
"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to
go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of
others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The
Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport
his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is
not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but
the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore,
under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways
or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent
manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will
be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct." II
Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135
and further ...
"Personal liberty -- consists of the power of locomotion, of changing
situations, of removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination
may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of
law." Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Black's Law Dictionary,
5th ed.; Blackstone's Commentary 134; Hare, Constitution__Pg.
777
Justice Tolman was concerned about the State prohibiting the Citizen from
the "most sacred of his liberties," the Right of movement, the Right
of moving one's self from place to place without threat of imprisonment,
the Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life.
When the State allows the formation of a corporation it may control
its creation by establishing guidelines (statutes) for its operation (charters).
Corporations who use the roads in the course of business do not use the
roads in the ordinary course of life. There is a difference between a corporation
and an individual. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
"...We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this
particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter
has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for examination on
the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his Constitutional
Rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in
his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the
State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors
to investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no
such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the
protection of his life, liberty, and property. His Rights are such as the
law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can
only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the
Constitution. Among his Rights are the refusal to incriminate himself,
and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except
under warrant of law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does
not trespass upon their rights.
"Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state.
It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives
certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the
laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its rights to act
as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws
of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate
its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would
be a strange anomaly to hold that the State, having chartered a corporation
to make use of certain franchises, could not in exercise of its sovereignty
inquire how those franchises had been employed, and whether they had been
abused, and demand the production of corporate books and papers for that
purpose." Hale vs. Hinkel, 201 US 43, 74-75
Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the purview of the
State's admiralty jurisdiction, and the public at large must be protected
from their activities, as they (the corporations) are engaged in business
for profit.
"...Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the
plenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police
power (see police power, infra.), may absolutely prohibit the use
of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business for
gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary
Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual way and the use of
the streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business
for private gain. The former is a common Right, the latter is an extraordinary
use. As to the former, the legislative power is confined to regulation,
as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition.
Since the use of the streets by a common carrier in the prosecution of
its business as such is not a right but a mere license of privilege."
Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516
It will be necessary to review early cases and legal authority in order
to reach a lawfully correct theory dealing with this Right or "privilege."
We will attempt to reach a sound conclusion as to what is a "Right to
use the road" and what is a "privilege to use the road". Once
reaching this determination, we shall then apply those positions to modern
case decision.
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be
no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda
vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491
and ...
"The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be converted
into a crime." Miller vs. U.S., 230 F. 486, 489
and ...
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this
exercise of constitutional Rights." Snerer vs. Cullen,
481 F. 946
Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose of
travel and transportation by the public. Such travel may be for business
or pleasure.
"The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation
is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the
public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived." Chicago
Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22; Ligare vs. Chicago,
28 NE 934; Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607; 25 Am.Jur.
(1st) Highways Sect.163
and ...
"The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, either by horse drawn carriage or by automobile,
is not a mere privilege which a city can prohibit or permit at will, but
a common Right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness." Thompson vs. Smith, 154 SE 579
So we can see that a Citizen has a Right to travel upon the public highways
by automobile and the Citizen cannot be rightfully deprived of his Liberty.
So where does the misconception that the use of the public road is always
and only a privilege come from?
"... For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways
and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the
use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private
gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways
of the state, but is a privilege or a license which the legislature may
grant or withhold at its discretion." State vs. Johnson,
243 P. 1073; Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171; Packard
vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256; Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98
Wash 516
Here the court held that a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public
highways, but that he did not have the right to conduct business upon the
highways. On this point of law all authorities are unanimous.
"Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a
Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport
his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways,
either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain." Willis
vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982; Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners,
17 P.2d 82
and ...
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport
his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs
radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place
of business for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus."
State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864
What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so "radically and obviously"
from one who uses the highway as a place of business? Who better to enlighten
us than Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of Washington State? In State
vs. City of Spokane, supra, the Court also noted a very
"radical and obvious" difference, but went on to explain just what
the difference is:
"The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a common
right to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."
and ...
"This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized
by all the authorities." State vs. City of Spokane, supra.
This position does not hang precariously upon only a few cases, but has
been proclaimed by an impressive array of cases ranging from the state
courts to the federal courts.
"the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport
his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business, differs
radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place
of business and uses it for private gain in the running of a stagecoach
or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen,
a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."
Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781
and ...
"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business,
is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty,
to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It
includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances
of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right
to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile
thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business."
Thompson vs. Smith, supra.; Teche Lines vs. Danforth,
Miss., 12 S.2d 784
There is no dissent among various authorities as to this position. (See
Am. Jur. [1st] Const. Law, 329 and corresponding Am.
Jur. [2nd].)
"Personal liberty -- or the right to enjoyment of life and liberty --
is one of the fundamental or natural rights, which has been protected by
its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not
derived from nor dependent on the U.S. Constitution. ... It is one of the
most sacred and valuable rights [remember the words of Justice Tolman,
supra.] as sacred as the right to private property ... and is regarded
as inalienable." 16 C.J.S. Const. Law, Sect.202, Pg. 987
As we can see, the distinction between a "Right" to use the public
roads and a "privilege" to use the public roads is drawn upon the
line of "using the road as a place of business" and the various
state courts have held so. But what have the U.S. Courts held on this point?
"First, it is well established law that the highways of the state are
public property, and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes,
and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which,
generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees
fit." Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251; Pachard
vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited; Frost and F. Trucking
Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592; Railroad commission
vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290; Parlett Cooperative
vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313
So what is a privilege to use the roads? By now it should be apparent even
to the "learned" that an attempt to use the road as a place of business
is a privilege. The distinction must be drawn between ...
-
Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads,
which is our Right; and ...
-
Using the public roads as a place of business or a main instrumentality
of business, which is a privilege.
"[The roads] ... are constructed and maintained at public expense,
and no person therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, a vested
right to their use in carrying on a commercial business." Ex
Parte Sterling, 53 SW.2d 294; Barney vs. Railroad Commissioners,
17 P.2d 82; Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.
"When the public highways are made the place of business the state
has a right to regulate their use in the interest of safety and convenience
of the public as well as the preservation of the highways." Thompson
vs. Smith, supra.
"[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the nature
of the business and the use of the highways in connection therewith." Ibid.
"We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for commercial
purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in
the interest of the public, the state may prohibit or regulate ... the
use of the highways for gain." Robertson vs. Dept. of Public
Works, supra.
There should be considerable authority on a subject as important a this
deprivation of the liberty of the individual "using the roads in the
ordinary course of life and business." However, it should be noted
that extensive research has not turned up one case or authority acknowledging
the state's power to convert the individual's right to travel upon the
public roads into a "privilege."
Therefore, it is concluded that the Citizen does have a "Right"
to travel and transport his property upon the public highways and roads
and the exercise of this Right is not a "privilege."
DEFINITIONS
In order to understand the correct application of the statute in question,
we must first define the terms used in connection with this point of law.
As will be shown, many terms used today do not, in their legal context,
mean what we assume they mean, thus resulting in the misapplication of
statutes in the instant case.
AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE
There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle.
An automobile has been defined as:
"The word `automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the
transportation of persons on highways." American Mutual Liability
Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200
While the distinction is made clear between the two as the courts have
stated:
"A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than
an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration
is received." International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle,
251 P. 120
The term `motor vehicle' is different and broader than the
word `automobile.'" City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse,
23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232
The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31:
"Motor vehicle" means every description or other contrivance
propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes
on the highways in the transportation of passengers, or passengers and
property.
"Used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons
or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or
directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking
intended for profit.
Clearly, an automobile is private property in use for private purposes,
while a motor vehicle is a machine which may be used upon the highways
for trade, commerce, or hire.
TRAVEL
The term "travel" is a significant term and is defined as:
"The term `travel' and `traveler' are usually construed in their broad
and general sense ... so as to include all those who rightfully use the
highways viatically (when being reimbursed for expenses) and who have occasion
to pass over them for the purpose of business, convenience, or pleasure."
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect.427, Pg. 717
"Traveler -- One who passes from place to place, whether for
pleasure, instruction, business, or health." Locket vs. State,
47 Ala. 45; Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3309
"Travel -- To journey or to pass through or over; as a country
district, road, etc. To go from one place to another, whether on foot,
or horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, an automobile, carriage,
ship, or aircraft; Make a journey." Century Dictionary, Pg. 2034
Therefore, the term "travel" or "traveler" refers to one
who uses a conveyance to go from one place to another, and included all
those who use the highways as a matter of Right.
Notice that in all these definitions, the phrase "for hire" never
occurs. This term "travel" or "traveler" implies, by definition,
one who uses the road as a means to move from one place to another.
Therefore, one who uses the road in the ordinary course of life and
business for the purpose of travel and transportation is a traveler.
DRIVER
The term "driver" in contradistinction to "traveler,"
is defined as:
"Driver -- One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon,
or other vehicle ..." Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 940
Notice that this definition includes one who is "employed" in conducting
a vehicle. It should be self-evident that this individual could not be
"travelling" on a journey, but is using the road as a place of business.
OPERATOR
Today we assume that a "traveler" is a "driver," and a
"driver" is an "operator." However, this is not the case.
"It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction
is to be drawn between the terms `operator' and `driver';
the `operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed
to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for
hire; while the `driver' is the one who actually drives the car.
However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the
same person to be both `operator' and `driver.'" Newbill
vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658
To further clarify the definition of an "operator" the court observed
that this was a vehicle "for hire" and that it was in the business
of carrying passengers.
This definition would seem to describe a person who is using the road
as a place of business, or in other words, a person engaged in the "privilege"
of using the road for gain.
This definition, then, is a further clarification of the distinction
mentioned earlier, and therefore:
-
Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads as
a matter of Right meets the definition of a traveler.
-
Using the road as a place of business as a matter of privilege meets the
definition of a driver or an operator or both.
TRAFFIC
Having defined the terms "automobile," "motor vehicle,"
"traveler," "driver," and "operator," the next term
to define is "traffic":
"... Traffic thereon is to some extent destructive, therefore, the prevention
of unnecessary duplication of auto transportation service will lengthen
the life of the highways or reduce the cost of maintenance, the revenue
derived by the state ... will also tend toward the public welfare by producing
at the expense of those operating for private gain, some small part of
the cost of repairing the wear ..." Northern Pacific R.R. Co. vs.
Schoenfeldt, 213 P. 26
Note: In the above, Justice Tolman expounded upon the key of raising revenue
by taxing the "privilege" to use the public roads "at the expense
of those operating for gain."
In this case, the word "traffic" is used in conjunction with
the unnecessary Auto Transportation Service, or in other words, "vehicles
for hire." The word "traffic" is another word which is to be
strictly construed to the conducting of business.
"Traffic -- Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise,
bills, money, or the like. The passing of goods and commodities from one
person to another for an equivalent in goods or money ..." Bovier's
Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3307
Here again, notice that this definition refers to one "conducting business."
No mention is made of one who is travelling in his automobile. This definition
is of one who is engaged in the passing of a commodity or goods in exchange
for money, i.e .., vehicles for hire.
Furthermore, the word "traffic" and "travel" must have
different meanings which the courts recognize. The difference is recognized
in Ex Parte Dickey, supra:
"...in addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses, taxicabs,
and hacks, when unnecessarily numerous, interfere with the ordinary traffic
and travel and obstruct them."
The court, by using both terms, signified its recognition of a distinction
between the two. But, what was the distinction? We have already defined
both terms, but to clear up any doubt:
"The word `traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary sense, and
has reference to the business of transportation rather than to its primary
meaning of interchange of commodities." Allen vs. City of Bellingham,
163 P. 18
Here the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has defined the word
"traffic" (in either its primary or secondary sense) in reference
to business, and not to mere travel! So it is clear that the term "traffic"
is business related and therefore, it is a "privilege." The net
result being that "traffic" is brought under the (police) power
of the legislature. The term has no application to one who is not using
the roads as a place of business.
LICENSE
It seems only proper to define the word "license," as the definition
of this word will be extremely important in understanding the statutes
as they are properly applied:
"The permission, by competent authority to do an act which without permission,
would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort." People vs. Henderson,
218 NW.2d 2, 4
"Leave to do a thing which licensor could prevent." Western
Electric Co. vs. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118
In order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the state would
have to take up the position that the exercise of a Constitutional Right
to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life and business is
illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which the state could then regulate or
prevent.
This position, however, would raise magnitudinous Constitutional questions
as this position would be diametrically opposed to fundamental Constitutional
Law. (See "Conversion of a Right to a Crime," infra.)
In the instant case, the proper definition of a "license" is:
"a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for
consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation
or to carry on some business which is subject to regulation under the police
power." Rosenblatt vs. California State Board of Pharmacy,
158 P.2d 199, 203
This definition would fall more in line with the "privilege" of
carrying on business on the streets.
Most people tend to think that "licensing" is imposed by the
state for the purpose of raising revenue, yet there may well be more subtle
reasons contemplated; for when one seeks permission from someone to do
something he invokes the jurisdiction of the "licensor" which, in
this case, is the state. In essence, the licensee may well be seeking to
be regulated by the "licensor."
"A license fee is a charge made primarily for regulation, with the fee
to cover costs and expenses of supervision or regulation." State
vs. Jackson, 60 Wisc.2d 700; 211 NW.2d 480, 487
The fee is the price; the regulation or control of the licensee is the
real aim of the legislation.
Are these licenses really used to fund legitimate government, or are
they nothing more than a subtle introduction of police power into every
facet of our lives? Have our "enforcement agencies" been diverted
from crime prevention, perhaps through no fault of their own, instead now
busying themselves as they "check" our papers to see that all are
properly endorsed by the state?
How much longer will it be before we are forced to get a license for
our lawn mowers, or before our wives will need a license for her "blender"
or "mixer?" They all have motors on them and the state can always
use the revenue.
POLICE POWER
The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation usually
arises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to a certain
act, or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certain sum be
paid for certain occupations. The power used in the instant case cannot,
however, be the power of taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a
Right would be open to Constitutional objection. (See "taxing power,"
infra.)
Each law relating to the use of police power must ask three questions:
"1. Is there threatened danger?
"2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right?
"3. Is this regulation reasonable?
People vs. Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715;
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under "Police Power"
When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some very
important issues emerge.
First, "is there a threatened danger" in the individual using
his automobile on the public highways, in the ordinary course of life and
business?
The answer is No! There is
nothing inherently dangerous in the use of an automobile when it is carefully
managed. Their guidance, speed, and noise are subject to a quick and easy
control, under a competent and considerate manager, it is as harmless on
the road as a horse and buggy.
It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that alone, which threatens
the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and to respond quickly
to guidance would seem to make the automobile one of the least dangerous
conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal, December, 1905.)
"The automobile is not inherently dangerous." Cohens
vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876; Blair vs. Broadmore, 93 SE
532
To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary
course of life and business, because one might, in the future, become dangerous,
would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but also the Right
to due process. (See "Due Process," infra.)
Next; does the regulation involve a Constitutional Right?
This question has already been addressed and answered in this brief,
and need not be reinforced other than to remind this Court that this Citizen
does have the Right to travel upon the public highway by automobile in
the ordinary course of life and business. It can therefore be concluded
that this regulation does involve a Constitutional Right.
The third question is the most important in this case. "Is this regulation
reasonable?"
The answer is No! It will
be shown later in "Regulation," infra., that this licensing statute
is oppressive and could be effectively administered by less oppressive
means.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with
the proper exercise of the police power, in accordance with the general
principle that the power must be exercised so as not to invade unreasonably
the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is established
beyond question that every state power, including the police power, is
limited by the Fourteenth Amendment (and others) and by the
inhibitions there imposed.
Moreover, the ultimate test of the propriety of police power regulations
must be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, since it operates
to limit the field of the police power to the extent of preventing the
enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the Amendment protects.
(See Parks vs. State, 64 NE 682.)
"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary
that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown
or impaired by any state police authority." Connolly vs. Union
Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R.
Co., 24 A. 848; O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co.,
108 A. 887
"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination
to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution." Bacahanan vs. Wanley,
245 US 60; Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission,
294 US 613
"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from
invasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express
and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions." Tiche vs. Osborne,
131 A. 60
"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police
power are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter,
although they are just as efficient as if expressed in the clearest language."
Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882
As it applies in the instant case, the language of the Fifth Amendment
is clear:
"No person shall be ... deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property
without due process of law."
As has been shown, the courts at all levels have firmly established
an absolute Right to travel.
In the instant case, the state, by applying commercial statutes to all
entities, natural and artificial persons alike, has deprived this free
and natural person of the Right of Liberty, without cause and without due
process of law.
DUE PROCESS
"The essential elements of due process of law are ... Notice and The
Opportunity to defend." Simon vs. Craft, 182 US 427
Yet, not one individual has been given notice of the loss of his/her Right,
let alone before signing the license (contract). Nor was the Citizen given
any opportunity to defend against the loss of his/her right to travel,
by automobile, on the highways, in the ordinary course of life and business.
This amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of Liberty.
"There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty ..."
Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31; Yick Wo vs. Hopkins,
118 US 356
and ...
"The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. This
Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta." Kent vs. Dulles,
357 US 116 (1958)
The focal point of this question of police power and due process must balance
upon the point of making the public highways a safe place for the public
to travel. If a man travels in a manner that creates actual damage, an
action would lie (civilly) for recovery of damages. The state could
then also proceed against the individual to deprive him of his Right to
use the public highways, for cause. This process would fulfill the due
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment while at the
same time insuring that Rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and
the state constitutions would be protected.
But unless or until harm or damage (a crime) is committed, there
is no cause for interference in the private affairs or actions of a Citizen.
One of the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of due
process of law, is that of Daniel Webster in his Dartmouth
College Case (4 Wheat 518), in which he declared that by due process
is meant:
"a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry,
and renders judgment only after trial." See also State vs. Strasburg,
110 P. 1020; Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333
Somewhat similar is the statement that is a rule as old as the law that:
"no one shall be personally bound (restricted) until he has had his
day in court,"
by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear and has been
afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and
opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is
judicial usurpation and it is oppressive and can never be upheld where
it is fairly administered. (12 Am.Jur. [1st] Const. Law, Sect. 573,
Pg. 269)
Note: This
sounds like the process used to deprive one of the "privilege" of
operating a motor vehicle "for hire." It should be kept in mind,
however, that we are discussing the arbitrary deprivation of the Right
to use the road that all citizens have "in common."
The futility of the state's position can be most easily observed in the
1959 Washington Attorney General's opinion on a similar issue:
"The distinction between the Right of the Citizen to use the public
highways for private, rather than commercial purposes is recognized ..."
and ...
"Under its power to regulate private uses of our highways, our legislature
has required that motor vehicle operators be licensed (I.C. 49-307). Undoubtedly,
the primary purpose of this requirement is to insure, as far as possible,
that all motor vehicle operators will be competent and qualified, thereby
reducing the potential hazard or risk of harm, to which other users of
the highways might otherwise be subject. But once having complied with
this regulatory provision, by obtaining the required license, a motorist
enjoys the privilege of travelling freely upon the highways ..."
Washington A.G.O. 59-60 No. 88, Pg. 11
This alarming opinion appears to be saying that every person using an automobile
as a matter of Right, must give up the Right and convert the Right into
a privilege. This is accomplished under the guise of regulation. This statement
is indicative of the insensitivity, even the ignorance, of the government
to the limits placed upon governments by and through the several constitutions.
This legal theory may have been able to stand in 1959; however, as of
1966, in the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda,
even this weak defense of the state's actions must fall.
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be
no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda
vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491
Thus the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the Citizen's
Right to travel upon the public roads, by passing legislation forcing the
citizen to waive his Right and convert that Right into a privilege. Furthermore,
we have previously established that this "privilege" has been defined
as applying only to those who are "conducting business in the streets"
or "operating for-hire vehicles."
The legislature has attempted (by legislative fiat) to deprive
the Citizen of his Right to use the roads in the ordinary course of life
and business, without affording the Citizen the safeguard of "due process
of law." This has been accomplished under supposed powers of regulation.
REGULATION
"In addition to the requirement that regulations governing the use of
the highways must not be violative of constitutional guarantees, the prime
essentials of such regulation are reasonableness, impartiality, and definiteness
or certainty." 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect. 260
and ...
"Moreover, a distinction must be observed between the regulation of
an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried
on by government sufferance of permission." Davis vs. Massachusetts,
167 US 43; Pachard vs. Banton, supra.
One can say for certain that these regulations are impartial since they
are being applied to all, even though they are clearly beyond the limits
of the legislative powers. However, we must consider whether such regulations
are reasonable and non-violative of constitutional guarantees.
First, let us consider the reasonableness of this statute requiring
all persons to be licensed (presuming that we are applying this statute
to all persons using the public roads). In determining the reasonableness
of the statute we need only ask two questions:
1. Does the statute accomplish its stated goal?
The answer is No!
The attempted explanation for this regulation "to insure the safety
of the public by insuring, as much as possible, that all are competent
and qualified."
However, one can keep his license without retesting, from the time he/she
is first licensed until the day he/she dies, without regard to the competency
of the person, by merely renewing said license before it expires. It is
therefore possible to completely skirt the goal of this attempted regulation,
thus proving that this regulation does not accomplish its goal.
Furthermore, by testing and licensing, the state gives the appearance
of underwriting the competence of the licensees, and could therefore be
held liable for failures, accidents, etc. caused by licensees.
2. Is the statute reasonable?
The answer is No!
This statute cannot be determined to be reasonable since it requires
to the Citizen to give up his or her natural Right to travel unrestricted
in order to accept the privilege. The purported goal of this statute could
be met by much less oppressive regulations, i.e., competency tests and
certificates of competency before using an automobile upon the public roads.
(This is exactly the situation in the aviation sector.)
But isn't this what we have now?
The answer is No! The real
purpose of this license is much more insidious. When one signs the license,
he/she gives up his/her Constitutional Right to travel in order to accept
and exercise a privilege. After signing the license, a quasi-contract,
the Citizen has to give the state his/her consent to be prosecuted for
constructive crimes and quasi-criminal actions where there is no harm done
and no damaged property.
These prosecutions take place without affording the Citizen of their
Constitutional Rights and guarantees such a the Right to a trial by jury
of twelve persons and the Right to counsel, as well as the normal safeguards
such as proof of intent and a corpus dilecti and a grand jury indictment.
These unconstitutional prosecutions take place because the Citizen is exercising
a privilege and has given his/her "implied consent" to legislative
enactments designed to control interstate commerce, a regulatable enterprise
under the police power of the state.
We must now conclude that the Citizen is forced to give up Constitutional
guarantees of "Right" in order to exercise his state "privilege"
to travel upon the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business.
SURRENDER OF RIGHTS
A Citizen cannot be forced to give up his/her Rights in the name of
regulation.
"... the only limitations found restricting the right of the state to
condition the use of the public highways as a means of vehicular transportation
for compensation are (1) that the state must not exact of those
it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they surrender
any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as a condition precedent
to obtaining permission for such use ..." Riley vs. Laeson,
142 So. 619; Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.
If one cannot be placed in a position of being forced to surrender Rights
in order to exercise a privilege, how much more must this maxim of law,
then, apply when one is simply exercising (putting into use) a Right?
"To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the rights of person
or property, without a regular trial, according to the course and usage
of the common law, would not be the law of the land." Hoke vs.
Henderson, 15 NC 15
and ...
"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to
be surrendered in order to assert another." Simons vs. United
States, 390 US 389
Since the state requires that one give up Rights in order to exercise the
privilege of driving, the regulation cannot stand under the police power,
due process, or regulation, but must be exposed as a statute which is oppressive
and one which has been misapplied to deprive the Citizen of Rights guaranteed
by the United States Constitution and the state constitutions.
TAXING POWER
"Any claim that this statute is a taxing statute would be immediately
open to severe Constitutional objections. If it could be said that the
state had the power to tax a Right, this would enable the state to destroy
Rights guaranteed by the constitution through the use of oppressive taxation.
The question herein, is one of the state taxing the Right to travel by
the ordinary modes of the day, and whether this is a legislative object
of the state taxation.
The views advanced herein are neither novel nor unsupported by authority.
The question of taxing power of the states has been repeatedly considered
by the Supreme Court. The Right of the state to impede or embarrass the
Constitutional operation of the U.S. Government or the Rights which the
Citizen holds under it, has been uniformly denied." McCulloch
vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316
The power to tax is the power to destroy, and if the state is given the
power to destroy Rights through taxation, the framers of the Constitution
wrote that document in vain.
"... It may be said that a tax of one dollar for passing through the
state cannot sensibly affect any function of government or deprive a Citizen
of any valuable Right. But if a state can tax ... a passenger of one dollar,
it can tax him a thousand dollars." Crandall vs. Nevada,
6 Wall 35, 46
and ...
"If the Right of passing through a state by a Citizen of the United
States is one guaranteed by the Constitution, it must be sacred from state
taxation." Ibid., Pg. 47
Therefore, the Right of travel must be kept sacred from all forms of state
taxation and if this argument is used by the state as a defense of the
enforcement of this statute, then this argument also must fail.
CONVERSION OF A RIGHT TO
A CRIME
As previously demonstrated, the Citizen has the Right to travel and
to transport his property upon the public highways in the ordinary course
of life and business. However, if one exercises this Right to travel (without
first giving up the Right and converting that Right into a privilege) the
Citizen is by statute, guilty of a crime. This amounts to converting the
exercise of a Constitutional Right into a crime.
Recall the Miller vs. U.S. and Snerer vs. Cullen
quotes from Pg. 5, and:
"The state cannot diminish Rights of the people." Hurtado
vs. California, 110 US 516
and ...
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be
no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda,
supra.
Indeed, the very purpose for creating the state under the limitations of
the constitution was to protect the rights of the people from intrusion,
particularly by the forces of government.
So we can see that any attempt by the legislature to make the act of
using the public highways as a matter of Right into a crime, is void upon
its face.
Any person who claims his Right to travel upon the highways, and so
exercises that Right, cannot be tried for a crime of doing so. And yet,
this Freeman stands before this court today to answer charges for the "crime"
of exercising his Right to Liberty.
As we have already shown, the term "drive" can only apply to
those who are employed in the business of transportation for hire. It has
been shown that freedom includes the Citnzen's Right to use the public
highways in the ordinary course of life and business without license or
regulation by the police powers of the state.
CONCLUSION
It is the duty of the court to recognize the substance of things and
not the mere form.
"The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be misled by
mere pretenses. They are at liberty -- indeed they are under a solemn duty
-- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry
whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If,
therefore, a statute purported to have been enacted to protect ... the
public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects or
is a palpable invasion of Rights secured by the fundamental law, it is
the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."
Mulger vs. Kansas, 123 US 623, 661
and ...
"It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the Constitutional
rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."
Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616
The courts are "duty bound" to recognize and stop the "stealthy
encroachments" which have been made upon the Citizen's Right to travel
and to use the roads to transport his property in the "ordinary course
of life and business." (Hadfield, supra.)
Further, the court must recognize that the Right to travel is part of
the Liberty of which a Citizen cannot be deprived without specific cause
and without the "due process of law" guaranteed in the Fifth
Amendment. (Kent, supra.)
The history of this "invasion" of the Citizen's Right to use
the public highways shows clearly that the legislature simply found a heretofore
untapped source of revenue, got greedy, and attempted to enforce a statute
in an unconstitutional manner upon those free and natural individuals who
have a Right to travel upon the highways. This was not attempted in an
outright action, but in a slow, meticulous, calculated encroachment upon
the Citizen's Right to travel.
This position must be accepted unless the prosecutor can show his authority
for the position that the "use of the road in the ordinary course of
life and business" is a privilege.
To rule in any other manner, without clear authority for an adverse
ruling, will infringe upon fundamental and basic concepts of Constitutional
law. This position, that a Right cannot be regulated under any guise, must
be accepted without concern for the monetary loss of the state.
"Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional Mandate cannot be tolerated,
even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some
respects the best interests of the public." Slote vs. Examination,
112 ALR 660
and ...
"Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of Constitutional guarantee."
Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR 1018; 16 Am.Jur. (2nd),
Const. Law, Sect. 81
and ...
"Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility
to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional
Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive
to deny them than to afford them." Watson vs. Memphis,
375 US 526
Therefore, the Court's decision in the instant case must be made without
the issue of cost to the state being taken into consideration, as that
issue is irrelevant. The state cannot lose money that it never had a right
to demand from the "Sovereign People."
Finally, we come to the issue of "public policy." It could be
argued that the "licensing scheme" of all persons is a matter of
"public policy." However, if this argument is used, it too must
fail, as:
"No public policy of a state can be allowed to override the positive
guarantees of the U.S. Constitution." 16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const.
Law, Sect. 70
So even "public policy" cannot abrogate this Citizen's Right to
travel and to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and
business.
Therefore, it must be concluded that:
"We have repeatedly held that the legislature may regulate the use of
the highways for carrying on business for private gain and that such regulation
is a valid exercise of the police power." Northern Pacific R.R.
Co., supra.
and ...
"The act in question is a valid regulation, and as such is binding upon
all who use the highway for the purpose of private gain." Ibid.
Any other construction of this statute would render it unconstitutional
as applied to this Citizen or any Citizen. The Accused therefore moves
this court to dismiss the charge against him, with prejudice.
In addition:
Since no notice is given to people applying for driver's (or other)
licenses that they have a perfect right to use the roads without any permission,
and that they surrender valuable rights by taking on the regulation system
of licensure, the state has committed a massive construction fraud. This
occurs when any person is told that they must have a license in order to
use the public roads and highways.
The license, being a legal contract under which the state is empowered
with policing powers, is only valid when the licensee takes on the burdens
of the contract and bargains away his or her rights knowingly, intentionally,
and voluntarily.
Few know that the driver's license is a contract without which the
police are powerless to regulate the people's actions or activities.
Few (if any) licensees intentionally surrender valuable rights. They
are told that they must have the license. As we have seen, this is not
the case.
No one in their right mind voluntarily surrenders complete liberty and
accepts in its place a set of regulations.
"The people never give up their liberties but under some delusion."
Edmund Burke, (1784)
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